REAL PROPERTY-LEASEHOLD

ESTATES-DAMAGE QUOTIENT
ASSESSED IN COMMERCIAL LANDLORD-TENANT SETrING-N. J.

Industrial Properties, Inc. v. YC.& VL. Inc., 100 N.J. 432, 495
A.2d 1320 (1985)
The property lease, with its roots in feudal times, has undergone significant alterations in this century.' Indeed, most jurisdictions have recognized that some antiquated real property
principles are not consonant with the realities of the modern
landlord-tenant relationship. 2 In recognition of the character of
the modern tenancy and in an attempt to effectuate the legitimate
expectations of the parties to a lease, courts have increasingly utilized contract law principles to interpret leases. This integration
of property and contract concepts has led to a significant improvement in landlord-tenant jurisprudence.' Notwithstanding
this development, cases encompassing the intersection of these
I See Weissenberger, The Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages On the Tenant's Abandonment: A Survey of Old Law and New Trends, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1980).
2 Id. at 1-2; see also, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 P. 638
(1915); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Wright v. Bauman,
239 Or. 2d 416, 398 P.2d 119 (1965). Realities of the modern tenancy include a
"well known package of goods" such as heat, hot water, walls, and elevator service,
all of which were of no concern to its agrarian ancestor which had a paramount
interest in the land. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
3 See, e.g., Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 777 (1977) ("the
distinction between a lease for ordinary residential purposes and an ordinary contract can no longer be considered viable"); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 141, 265
A.2d 526, 532 (1970) ("The guidelines employed to construe contracts have been
modernly applied to the construction of leases."). See generally Hicks, The Contractual
Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 445 (1972) [hereinafter Hicks]
(noting that "[i]n recent years real property leases have been encrusted with property law characteristics to the extent that other characteristics which they may possess have been largely hidden from view").
4 See, e.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272
(1969). The impetus for the improvement stems from a recognition of the unequal
bargaining power between a landlord and prospective tenant. Id. Historically, absent misrepresentation or an express covenant to repair, the doctrine of caveat
emptor governed a lease agreement and a tenant took leased property "as is." Id.
Today's tenant, however, benefits from an implied warranty of fitness through the
injection of contract principles into lease analysis. See also infra notes 102-14 and
accompanying text.
A further benefit which has inured to both the landlord and tenant is the premise that covenants in a lease are mutually dependent. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino,
63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). Traditionally, a tenant's failure to pay rent would
not give the landlord the right to forfeit the lease, nor would a landlord's failure to
repair leased premises give rise to a defense in an action to recover rent. Id. at 46768, 308 A.2d at 21. The mutual dependency doctrine, however, allows a landlord
to terminate the lease upon a tenant's failure to pay rent and allows a tenant to
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distinct bodies of law often present an analytical maelstrom.5
While a great amount of litigation has shaped the contours
of the residential lease, many courts have declined to address
similar issues with respect to the commercial lease.6 NewJersey's
Supreme Court, however, has long advanced the notion that the
modern property lease should be analyzed in accord with modern contract principles. 7 In N. J. IndustrialProperties,Inc. v. Y.C. &
VL. Inc. ,8 the supreme court addressed the conflict between principles of property and contract law in a commercial lease.9 Specifically, the court determined how a windfall in excess rent
should be distributed after a commercial tenant assignee
breached a lease.' 0 While traditional contract principles mandated that the injured party be made whole, and no more," the
invocation of property principles required the election between
withhold rent when premises are not habitable. Id.; see also infra notes 130-46 and
accompanying text.
5 SeeJavins, 428 F.2d at 1075. TheJavins court, speaking throughJudge Skelly
Wright, observed that the intersection of property and contract law "[piroceeding
piecemeal has, however, led to confusion where 'decisions are frequently conflicting, not because of a healthy disagreement on social policy, but because the lingering impact of rules whose policies are long since dead.' " Id. (quoting Kessler, The
Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262, 263 (1964)).
6 See, e.g., Sommer v. Kridel, 74 NJ. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977). The Sommer
court evaluated a landlord's duty to mitigate damages in the event of tenant default
on a residential lease. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, expressly reserved decision regarding a landlord's duty to mitigate damages in a commercial
setting. Id. at 456 n.4, 378 A.2d at 772 n.4; see also Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc.,
58 N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104, 106, modified on other grounds, 59 N.J. 330, 282 A.2d
746 (1971). The trial court held that the doctrine of Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130,
265 A.2d 526 (1970), that a residential tenant may withhold rent and make necessary repairs, was inapplicable in a commercial setting. Kruvant, 58 NJ. at 456, 279
A.2d at 106. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on different
grounds and left the issue concerning Marini unresolved. Id. In dicta, the Kruvant
court posited "[w]hen and under what circumstances the doctrine of Marini should
be applied in other than residential situations is a matter we leave open for future
determination in an appropriate case." Id.
7 See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (evaluating
implied warranty of habitability); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767
(1977) (landlord seeking damages for default under duty to mitigate); Berzito v.
Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (covenants of lease construed to be
mutually dependent); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (landlord's breach of implied covenant to make repairs entitles tenant to make repairs
and deduct cost from rent); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d
268 (1969) (evaluating implied warranty against latent defects).
8 100 N.J. 432, 496 A.2d 1320 (1985). In the majority opinion, the supreme
court referred to NewJersey Industrial Properties as N.J.I.P. and Y.C. & V.L. Inc. as
Y.C.V.L. These acronyms will be used in this note.
9 Id. at 437-46, 496 A.2d at 1323-28.
10 Id. at 433, 496 A.2d at 1321.
1 1 See 525 Main Street Corp. v. Eagle Roofing Co., 34 NJ. 251, 254, 168 A.2d
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complex alternatives.' 2 The court had the option either to award
the windfall to the landlord, who mitigated damages by finding a
subsequent tenant that paid a higher rent, or to credit the assignor who remained responsible for the assignee's breach.' 3 In
a four to three decision, the supreme court ruled in favor of the
landlord.14
In 1970, New Jersey Industrial Properties (N.J.I.P.) built a
commercial complex replete with approximately 30,000 feet of
floor space, a loading dock, office facilities, and off street parking.' 5 After negotiation, Y.C. & V.L. Corporation (Y.C.V.L.) entered a leasehold agreement with NJ.I.P. commencing on
January 1, 1977 and expiring on January 30, 1982.16 The lease
provided for a monthly rental of $4167 and mandated that the17
tenant pay all applicable taxes, utilities, and maintenance fees.
8
The principals and officers of Y.C.V.L., Yaffa and Vito Licari,1
also personally guaranteed performance of the corporation's obligations through the execution of a collateral agreement on December 29, 1977.19 Six months later, Y.C.V.L. assigned its
leasehold rights to Crayonne, U.S.A., Inc. (Crayonne), with the
assent of the landlord, N.J.I.P.2 ° As a condition of the assign33, 34 (1961); see also 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1338 at 198 (3d ed. 1968).
12 See Wilson v. Ruhl, 277 Md. 607, 356 A.2d 544, 546 (1976). At common law,
the landlord had three options upon a tenant's abandonment: the landlord could
reenter for his own benefit implying an acceptance of the abandonment and a termination of the tenancy; the landlord could reenter as agent of the tenant, attempt
to relet the premises for the account of the breaching tenant, and hold the tenant
liable for any current deficiency in rent as well as for any deficiency in the subsequent reletting as measured against the original rental; the landlord could remain
idle and hold the breaching tenant liable for the rent due on the remainder of the
entire term. Id.
3 See N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 433, 495 A.2d at 1321.
14 Id. at 469, 495 A.2d at 1341. Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, was
joined by Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices O'Hern and Handler. Justice Stein,
writing for the dissent, was joined by Justices Clifford and Pollock. Id.
15 Brief for Defendants at 1, N.J. Indus. Properties, Inc. v. Y.C. & V.L., Inc., 100
N.J. 432, 495 A.2d 1320 (1985) (No. A-5216-82T3) [hereinafter Brief for
Defendants].
16 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 434, 495 A.2d at 1321. When the lease was
originally executed, the Y.C.V.L. Corporation was known as Sheina Industries, Inc.
Shortly thereafter Sheina changed its name to Y.C.V.L. Id.
17 Id. Subsequently, the monthly rent was raised to $4461.91. Id.
18 Id. The corporate name, Y.C. & V.L., was derived from the initials of Yaffa
Licari (nee Chirnomas) and Vito Licari, who were the principals of Sheina Industries, Inc. Id.
1,) Id. Twelve days after the lease was signed, the Licaris promised that they
would pay rent and damages up to $26,000 in the event of a tenant default. Id.
20 Id., 495 A.2d at 1322.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:73

ment, Y.C.V.L., as assignor, agreed to remain liable for performance of the lease. 2 The Licaris' personal guarantee also survived
the assignment.2 2 After Crayonne occupied the premises, Yaffa
and Vito Licari were employed in an advisory role by Crayonne
for approximately one year.2 3 Thereafter, all dealings between
the Licaris and Crayonne ceased.2 4
In early June 1981, with eight months remaining on the
lease, Crayonne unexpectedly vacated the premises. 25 An investigation by N.J.I.P. revealed that Crayonne had failed to pay rent,
taxes, insurance, and other charges due in June 1981.26 Moreover, the abandoned premises had not been properly maintained
by the assignee, Crayonne.2 7 OnJune 11, 1981, N.J.I.P. advised
Crayonne that the lease was terminated due to the breach. 28 Simultaneously, Y.C.V.L. was notified of the termination and reminded of its responsibilities as assignor.2 9 Yaffa and Vito Licari
21 Id. Y.C.V.L.'s surviving liability was stipulated in a rider to the lease with
Crayonne. Id.
22 Id.; see also supra note 19.
23 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 451, 495 A.2d at 1331 (Stein, J., dissenting).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Brief for Defendants, supra note 15, at 4. The premises were described as
having a damaged roof, missing gutters and leaders, broken pavement, broken
glass, unkept grounds, and scattered debris. Id.
28 See NJ. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 451, 495 A.2d at 1331 (Stein, J., dissenting). The landlord, N.J.I.P., relied on paragraph 20 of the lease which provides:
20th: It is expressly understood and agreed that in case the demised
premises shall be deserted or vacated, or if default be made in the payment of the rent or any part thereof as herein specified, or if, without
the consent of the Landlord, the Tenant shall sell, assign, or mortgage
this lease or if default be made in the performance of any of the covenants and agreements in this lease contained on the part of the Tenant
to be kept and performed, or if the Tenant shall fail to comply with any
of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, regulations and requirements
of the Federal, State and City Government or of any and all their Departments and Bureaus, applicable to said premises, or if the Tenant
shall file or there be filed against Tenant a petition in bankruptcy or
arrangement, or Tenant be adjudicated a bankrupt, or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors or take advantage of any insolvency act,
the Landlord may, if the Landlord so elects, at any time thereafter terminate this lease and the term hereof, on giving the Tenant five days' notice in writing of the Landlord's intention so to do, and this lease and
the term hereof shall expire and come to an end on the date fixed in
such notice as if the said date were the date originally fixed in this lease
for the expiration hereof. Such notice may be given by mail to the Tenant addressed to the demised premises.
Id.
29 Id.
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were additionally advised of their obligations as personal guarantors of the original lease.30 Upon receipt of this notification,
Yaffa Licari attempted to contact the chief executive officer of
N.J.I.P. 3 ' She believed that if the Licaris and Y.C.V.L. were re-

sponsible for rent due on the remainder of the lease, they should
be permitted to occupy the premises.3 2 Mrs. Licari's proposal
33
was either rejected or not considered.
In an effort to mitigate damages, N.J.I.P. posted signs on the
premises indicating its availability. 4 More than 300 real estate
brokers were also informed of the vacancy. 35 Nevertheless, the
property remained unoccupied from June through September,
1981.36 On October 1, 1981, however, NJ.I.P. entered into a

new lease with Insulation Distributors Corporation (Insulation
Distributors).3 7 The lease was to run through September 1986
with a monthly rental of $7182.55.38 Significantly, N.J.I.P. collected $10,882.56 more from Insulation Distributors than it
would have collected from Crayonne for the four months remaining on the original lease. 9
N.J.I.P. filed a suit against Y.C.V.L. and the Licaris for
$17,847.64 in lost rent for the period fromJune to September of
1981 when the building was vacant. 4 0 The action was based on a
survival clause in the lease which mandated an extension of tenant liability even after termination of the lease. 4
30

Id.; see also supra note 19.

31 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 451, 495 A.2d at 1331 (Stein, J., dissenting).

32 Id. At this point, the Licaris were developing a houseware business. Id. The
Licaris' new business venture, Basic Line, Inc., was rapidly expanding and in need
of more industrial space. See Brief for Defendants, supra note 15, at 4-5.
33 See N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 451, 495 A.2d at 1331 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
34 Id. at 435, 495 A.2d at 1322.
35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 452, 495 A.2d at 1331 (Stein, J., dissenting). The difference between
the $7182.55 monthly rent paid by Insulation Distributors and the $4461.91
monthly rent owed by Crayonne is $2720.64. See id. Since four months remained
on the lease for Crayonne, the difference in the two monthly rentals multiplied by
four equals the $10,882.56 excess. See id.
40 See Brief for Defendants, supra note 15, at 7. In addition to damages for lost
rent, the complaint also alleged the following: cost of repaving parking lot, $6800;
cost of roof repair, cleaning premises, and repairing damage caused by Crayonne,
$7093; utilities, $507.22; insurance premiums, $338; advertising, $185; and attorney's fees. Id.
41 See N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 440, 495 A.2d at 1325. Paragraph 25 of
the lease provided in pertinent part:
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N.J.I.P. alleged that an independent cause of action arose
each month when rental obligations were not met.4 2 Specifically,
the landlord asserted that the measure of damages should be
based on the amount of rent lost each month ($4461.91) for each
43
of the four months the abandoned property was vacant.
N.J.I.P. maintained that Y.C.V.L. should only receive credit for
the last four months on the lease as a result of the rent collected
from Insulation Distributors 44 and should not be credited with
any of the excess rent collected for the four-month period when
the property was vacant.4 5
In diametrical opposition to N.J.I.P.'s theory on damages,
the defendant Y.C.V.L. argued that it, even though in default,
should be credited with all excess rent received.4 6 Y.C.V.L. alleged that the excess rent should be offset against the rent owed
for the four months that the property remained vacant prior to
the occupancy by the subsequent tenant, Crayonne.4 7 Furthermore, Y.C.V.L. asserted that the full term of the original lease
was the correct time frame for assessing damages.4 8
Under the terms of the original lease, had Crayonne not
abandoned the premises, N.J.I.P. would have received approximately $35,695.28 from June 1, 1981 to January 30, 1982. 4" The
In the event that the relation of the Landlord and Tenant may cease or
terminate by reason of the re-entry of the Landlord under the terms and
covenants contained in this lease ... or after the abandonment of the
premises by the Tenant, the Tenant shall remain liable and shall pay in
monthly payments the rent which accrues subsequent to the re-entry by
the Landlord, and the Tenant shall pay as damages . . . the difference
between the rent collected and received, if any, by the Landlord, during
the remainder of the unexpired term, such difference of [sic] deficiency
between the rent reserved and the rent collected, if any, shall become
due and payable in monthly payments during the remainder of the
unexpired term, as the amounts of such difference of deficiency shall
from time to time be ascertained.
Id.; see also Fleming v. Matter Construction Corp., 11 N.J. Misc. 129, 132, 164 A.
585 (Hudson Cty. Cir. Ct. 1933). In interpreting a similar lease, the Fleming court
asserted that, while a landlord's re-entry on surrendered premises after non-payment of rent worked a dissolution of the landlord-tenant relation, the contractual
liability of the tenant for subsequent rent due would remain unaffected. Id.
42 See N. J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 435, 495 A.2d at 1322.
43 Id. at 441, 495 A.2d at 1325.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 436, 495 A.2d at 1322.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 434, 495 A.2d at 1322. Under the original lease the monthly rent
during the time of the breach was $4461.91. The premises were vacant for eight
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subsequent reletting to Insulation Distributors netted Nj.I.P. approximately $28,730.20 between October 1, 1981 and January
30, 1982.50 The defendant asserted, therefore, that N.J.I.P. was
limited to damages of approximately $6965.085 '-the deficiency
between rent due and rent received for the term of the original
lease.
At trial, Superior Court Judge Edward McGrath held in favor
of the landlord, N.J.I.P.

52

Judge McGrath posited that the

"[d]efendants [N.J.I.P.] are not entitled to a credit for the surplus
rent paid by Insulation [Distributors] over and above the
monthly rent due from [Y.C.V.L.]." 53 On appeal, the appellate
division opined that paragraph ten 54 of the lease "expressly recognizes that after reimbursement of the landlord's re-entry expense, all of the balance of the subsequent tenant's rent is to be
applied to the defaulting tenant's account even if that balance
exceeds the defaulting tenant's own rent obligation. ' 55 Accordingly, the appellate division reversed on the issue of damages and
credited Y.C.V.L. with the excess rent N.J.I.P. received from Insulation Distributors.56
Defendant N.J.I.P.'s petition for certification was granted in
months.

Therefore, eight months rent at $4461.91 per month would total

$35,695.28.
50 Brief for Defendants, supra note 15, at 28.

Insulation Distributor's monthly

rent was $7182.55. Id. at 6.
51 See Brief for Defendants, supra note 15, at 16. The defendants alleged dam-

ages to be $4608. Id. This calculation utilized the previous monthly rent of $4167
per month and is apparently inaccurate. See id. The trial court used the monthly
rental at the time of the breach which was $4461.91. N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at

438 n.2, 495 A.2d at 1331 n.2. Using the figure $4461.91, the defendant's theory
of damages would result in an amount of $6965.08. Id.
52 Id. at 437, 495 A.2d at 1323.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 438, 495 A.2d at 1324. Paragraph 10 provides:

10th: That if the said premises, or any part thereof, shall become vacant
during the said term, or should the Tenant be evicted by summary proceedings or otherwise, the Landlord or Landlord's representatives may
re-enter the same either by force or otherwise, without being liable to
prosecution therefor; and re-let the said premises as the Agent of the
said Tenant and receive the rent thereof; applying the same, first to the
payment of such expenses as the Landlord may be put to in re-entering
and then to the payment of the rent due by these presents; the balance

(if any) to be paid over to the Tenant who shall remain liable for any
deficiency.
Id. (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 437, 495 A.2d at 1323 (emphasis in original).
56 Id.
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September 198417 on the limited issue of the amount of credit a
commercial tenant in default should receive. 58 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate division,
reasoning that as between a defaulting tenant and a landlord who
promptly mitigates, the tenant should not receive the benefit resulting from his breach.59
Justice Frankfurter once noted that the law of real property,
more than any other area of jurisprudence, has been guided by
distinctions whose validity are largely historical.60 Landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal leasehold estates in an agrarian society, embodied the notion that a lease conveyed an interest in
land to a tenant. 6 ' This principal was viable in the rural setting in
which it originated.62 It was no longer suitable, however, after
the development of cities and societies with advanced economic
systems.63

In the modern day lease, the value of the land is "relatively
small in comparison to the total value of the demised premises. '"64 The very object of the letting is to furnish the tenant
65
with a "package of goods" suitable for his intended purposes.
Consequently, the salient characteristic of the modern lease 66 is
the mutual exchange of promises, with an interest in land being
57 N. J. Indus. Properties, Inc. v. Y.C. & V.L., Inc., 97 N.J. 690, 483 A.2d 202
(1984).
58 N. J.Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 437, 495 A.2d at 1323.
59 Id. at 448, 449, 495 A.2d at 1330.
60 See Jones v. United States, 360 U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
61 See generally Hicks, supra note 3, at 445-51 (discussing origin and history of real
property lease).
62 Id.
63 See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 141, 265 A.2d 526, 532 (1970) (citing 1
American Law of Property, § 3.78 at 347 (1952)).
64 Note, The Modern Lease-An Estate In Land Or a Contract, 16 TEX. L. REV. 47, 72
(1937).
65 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("When American city dwellers, both rich and poor,
seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package of goods and services.") (emphasis
added); see also Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 533-34 (1970)
(landlord's breach of implied covenant to make repairs entitles tenant to make repairs and deduct cost from rent).
66 See L. SCHAUB & N. IsAAcs, THE LAW IN BusINESS PROBLEMS at 295-96 (1925).
The author notes that:
The influence of business concepts in dealing with land is nowhere
more evident than in the manner in which leases, which were formerly
thought of as grants, have come to be considered simply formal contracts. From a relation that once determined a man's social and political
standing, a relation that assigned to him a court within which to seek
protection for his rights, a relation which shaped his obligations of patriotism and loyalty, it has degenerated or developed into a purely contrac-
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only incidental.67 The incorporation of contract law principles in
the evaluation of leases has thus become an integral facet of landlord-tenant jurisprudence.68
Prior to the recent integration of contract and property prin-

ciples, landlords confronted by a defaulting tenant were faced
with rigid options based on inveterate property law concepts.6 9
At common law, a landlord's re-entry following a tenant's default
constituted a surrender of the original lease. 70 Thus, the landlord
could re-enter the premises and release the tenant from all further liability in the hope of successfully reletting, or allow the
premises to remain vacant and sue for rent as it became due.7 1
Landlords, however, overcame these inadequate alternatives by
including express covenants in the lease which nullified these restrictions and permitted more flexible remedies. 72 Judicial recognition of these covenants represented a dominant incursion of
contract principles into the realm of real property law.73
tual relation, differing from the most ordinary commercial relation only
in one or two anomalous particulars.
Id.

See Wright v. Bauman, 239 Or. 410, 411, 398 P.2d 119, 120 (1965).
See N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 461, 495 A.2d at 1336-37 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein noted that contract principles have "a broad and general
application, not only to commercial contracts but also to leases of property." Id.,
495 A.2d at 1337.
69 See id. at 454, 495 A.2d at 1332 (Stein, J., dissenting). Historically, a lease
conveyed an interest in the property to the tenant and thus prohibited any control
by the landlord. Id. Consequently, the landlord at common law was severely restricted in his remedies after a tenant defaulted because he was under no duty to
mitigate damages. Id.
70 McCormick, The Rights Of The Landlord Upon Abandonment Of The Premises By The
Tenant, 23 MICH. L. REV. 211, 212 (1925). After a tenant defaults and abandons the
premises:
[t]he advice that the landlord would like to hear from his attorney under
such circumstances is that he has the privilege of resuming control of
the premises for the tenant's account and letting them out again to
other tenants for the balance of the term as best he may, and then of
holding the tenant liable for the original rent he contracted to pay, less
the collections thus made by the landlord.
Id.
Professor McCormick also observed, however, that the theory of surrender
upon re-entry was premised upon the common law principle that two exclusive
rights of possession could not co-exist. Thus, the validity of the old tenancy is
destroyed by the new one. Id.
71 See N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 454, 495 A.2d at 1332-33 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
72 Id. at 455, 495 A.2d at 1333 (Stein, J., dissenting).
73 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 221 at 180-82 (1986). Professor Powell noted:
This growth in the number and detail of specific lease covenants has
reintroduced into the law of estates for years a predominantly contrac67
68
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The dual nature of the real property lease was explored in
Samuels v. Ottinger, a 1915 California case. 4 In that decision, the
California Supreme Court analyzed whether an original tenant,
the city of San Francisco, would remain liable after a subsequent
assignee had defaulted. 75 The Samuels court initially observed
that "[a] lease has a dual character-it presents the aspect of a
contract and also that of a conveyance." ' 76 The relationship between landlord and tenant thus creates obligations based on privity of estate, while express covenants in a lease give rise to
responsibilities premised on privity of contract.7 7 Moreover, the
court reasoned that when a tenant assigns a leasehold interest,
the assignee is drawn into privity of estate with the landlord but
the original tenant also remains in privity of contract with the
landlord. 78 Accordingly, the Samuels court held that the city's assignment of its leasehold did not remove the liability for rent imposed by the covenants in the lease. 9
In 1933, in Fleming v. Matter Construction Corp.,s ° the lessor
evicted its tenants after default on rental payments and subsequently reoccupied the premises.8 1 The defaulting tenant argued
that the landlord's reoccupation of the premises effected a suspension of all rent accruing thereafter.8 " In Fleming, a New Jersey
court opined that ordinarily, when leased premises are re-entual ingredient. In practice, the law today concerning estates for years
consists chiefly of rules determining the construction and effect of lease
covenants.
Id.
74 169 Cal. 209, 146 P. 638 (1915).
75 See id. at 211, 146 P. at 638.

Id., 146 P. at 638-39.
Id.
Id.; see also Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411,
132 P.2d 56 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (interpretation of non-competition clause in lease
should be construed in accordance with general contract principles because parties
remain in privity of contract).
79 Samuels, 169 Cal. at 212, 146 P. at 639. See also Ellingson v. Walsh, O'Conner
& Barneson, 15 Cal. 2d 673, 104 P.2d 507 (1940). In Ellingson, the defendant,
Barneson, became a member of a partnership which had previously executed a
lease for office space. Thereafter, a sublessee defaulted and the landlord sought a
judgment for rent against the partnership. Id. at 675, 104 P.2d at 508. Defendant
Barneson argued that he could not be liable because he was not a party to the
original lease. The Ellingson court, however, held that while he was not in privity of
contract with the landlord, Barneson's occupancy of the premises rendered him in
privity of estate. Id. at 676, 104 P.2d at 509. Accordingly, Barneson was liable for
rent. Id.
80 11 N.J. Misc. 129, 164 A. 585 (Hudson Cty. Cir. Ct. 1933).
81 Id. at 131, 164 A. at 585.
82 Id. at 131-32, 164 A. at 585-86.
76
77
78
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tered by the landlord, a surrender is implied by law; thus, the
tenant's liability is extinguished since the relationship between
the landlord and tenant has ceased.83 The court also recognized,
however, that parties to a lease may covenant that a surrender of
the premises will not necessitate a release of the tenant's liability
for rent not yet due.84 Moreover, the court posited that within
this type of covenant, a breach and re-entry still terminate the
landlord-tenant relationship.85 Such a termination, however,
does not affect the lessee's surviving contractual liability.8 6 The
Fleming court, after noting that a survival covenant was encompassed in the lease, held that the tenant's contractual liability survived the eviction by the landlord.87
Similarly, in McCready v. Lindenborn,88 the New York Court of
Appeals examined the validity of a survival clause.89 In McCready,
the defendant tenant failed to pay rent in December 1894 on a
lease which commenced on October 1, 1894 and was due to expire in April 1904.90 The lower court held that the tenant's
breach gave rise to a cause of action for "breach of the lease as an
entirety, and the recovery of all the damages [could be attained]
in a single action brought before the expiration of the term."'
The pertinent lease agreement in McCready stated that the tenant
83

Id.

Id.; see also Raleigh Realty Corp. v. Jacobs, 127 N.J.L. 454, 455 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1941). In Raleigh, the lease provided:
[I]n case of default in any of the covenants, or if the said premises shall
become vacant at any time during the term thereof, the Landlord may
resume possession of the premises and relet the same for the remainder
of the term at the best rent he can obtain for the account of the Tenant,
who will make good any deficiency.
Id. In an opinion by justice Parker, the NewJersey Supreme Court ruled that "[t]he
clear implication of the language [of the lease] is that the tenant remains liable for
rent if he deserts the premises or is evicted because of default in his obligations."
Id. at 455.
85 Fleming, 11 N.J. Misc. at 132, 164 A. at 586.
86 Id.; see also Fibbish v. Bennett, 131 N.J.L. 98, 35 A.2d 39 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1943)
(noting that the manner of dispossession, whether voluntary vacation or lawful
eviction proceedings, does not absolve tenant from contractual obligations to pay
rent when a survival covenant is encompassed in lease).
87 Fleming, 11 N.J. Misc. at 133, 164 A. at 586; see also N.J. Indus. Properties, 100
N.J. at 439, 495 A.2d at 1324, (citing 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant, § 559
(1970)) (lease must contain clear language that tenant shall remain liable for rent
after re-entry by landlord); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 12.1, comment
g (1977) (obligation of tenant to pay rent after lease terminated prematurely does
not arise unless expressly provided).
88 172 N.Y. 400, 65 N.E. 208 (1902).
89 Id. at 401, 65 N.E. at 208.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 408, 65 N.E. at 210.
84
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would pay damages calculated at the difference between the rent
reserved and the rent received in equal monthly payments.92 In
reversing the trial court, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that this language did not afford the landlord "a recovery
of all damages in advance;" rather, it constrained the landlord's
damages only to rent which had already accrued.93 The McCready
court measured damages accrued in rent lost monthly and opined
that "[t]he breach of an agreement to pay money in installments
is not a breach of the entire contract and will not permit a recov94
ery of all the damages in advance."

The vital import of contract principles in construing real
property leases was also recognized in the landmark 1970 case,
Javins v. FirstNational Realty Corp.9 5 In that case, the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined
whether housing code violations existing during the term of a
lease concomitantly effected a tenant's obligation to pay rent.96
TheJavins court, speaking through Judge Skelley Wright, recognized that "the old rules of property law governing leases are
inappropriate for today's transactions. In order to reach results
more in accord with the legitimate expectations of the parties. ...
courts have gradually been introducing more modern precepts of
contract law in interpreting leases." 97 The court therefore reasoned that housing code violations existing during the term of
the lease constituted a breach of a warranty of habitability implied by law. 98 Accordingly, the Javins court held that contract
law remedies should be utilized in rectifying such a breach. 99
Even with these doctrinal classifications supplied by Judge
Wright and other jurists, scholars still proffer discordant views
on the multifaceted real property lease. 00 One group posits that
a lease should still be regarded as a conveyance, others view it as
a contract, while some take the medial approach in asserting that
the lease is a conveyance with overlapping contractual
92 Id. at 402, 65 N.E. at 208 (amount of such difference to be ascertained from
time to time).
93 Id. at 408, 65 N.E. at 210.
94 Id.
95 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
96 Id. at 1072.
97 Id. at 1074-75.
98 Id. at 1080.
99 Id.

See Hicks, supra note 3, at 452 (detailing difference in opinion among scholars
concerning application of property and contract law principles to leases and broad
variations which may result).
100
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obligations.101
A significant progression in lease analysis occurred in the
landmark New Jersey case of Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper.'0 2 In
Reste, the defendant leased the basement floor of a commercial
building which periodically flooded rendering the premises substantially useless for the lessee's intended purpose.' 0 3 After several unsuccessful complaints, the defendant quit the premises
and ceased rental payments.' 0 4 At trial, the tenant's defense of
constructive eviction 0 5 was sustained, and judgment was entered
for the lessee. 10 6 The appellate division reversed, reasoning that
the landlord's failure to act was not significant enough to constitute a constructive eviction.' 0 7 Moreover, the appellate division
noted that if such an omission could be found, the defendant
waived it by failing to vacate the premises within a reasonable
time after the discovery of the flooding.' 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the defendant tenant's petition for certification because of the importance of the
issues presented.'0 9 The Reste court initially observed "that if a
lease is a demise of land and a sale of interest in land in the commercial sense, more realistic consideration should be given to the
contractual nature of the relationship." "0 Writing for the court,
Justice Francis recognized that caveat emptor historically governed
an estate for years and, absent an express covenant to the contrary or a fraudulent misrepresentation, the tenant assumed the
leasehold "as is.'""' The Reste court asserted that these doctrines
were inadequate, however, to meet modern economic and social
conditions." 2 In the court's opinion, the "present day demands
Id.
53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
Id. at 449-50, 251 A.2d at 270-71.
Id. at 450, 251 A.2d at 271.
Professor Powell observed that:
[a] 'constructive eviction' has been defined as a substantial and injurious
interference with the tenant's possession by the landlord or someone
acting under his authority, which renders the premises unfit for the purposes for which they were demised or which deprive the tenant of the
beneficial enjoyment of the premises, causing the tenant to abandon the
premises within a reasonable time.
2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 230[3] n.72 (1986).
106 Reste, 53 N.J. at 448, 251 A.2d at 270.
107 Id.
101
102
103
104
105

108 Id.
109 See id.

1I
t Id. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272 (emphasis added).
''M Id. at 451, 251 A.2d at 272.
112 Id. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272.
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of fair treatment for tenants with respect to latent defects remediable by the landlord.., require imposition on him of an implied
warranty against such defects." ' 1 3 Accordingly, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the landlord's failure to remedy the
flooding constituted a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
and therefore
it sustained the tenant's defense of constructive
4
eviction. "1

A further departure from traditional lease interpretation occurred in Marini v. Ireland. 1 5 At common law, a lease conveyed
part of the landlord's interest in land." 6 Consequently, a landlord was historically under no duty to maintain a leased property,
nor was an implied covenant of fitness recognized." 7 In Marini,
the commode in the defendant lessee's apartment cracked causing water to leak onto the floor." 8 Repeated attempts to inform
the recalcitrant landlord of the problem were unsuccessful. '1 9
Subsequently, the tenant hired a plumber to fix the leak and deducted the cost of repair from her next monthly rental
0
payment.12

The plaintiff landlord opposed the offsetting of the repair
cost and instituted summary dispossess proceedings against the
tenant. 2 ' The trial court noted that the lease contained a covenant of quiet enjoyment, but did not encompass a specific covenant for repairs. 22 Accordingly, the court held that the landlord
was under no duty to make specific repairs. 123 The New Jersey
Supreme Court certified the case on its own motion prior to a
2 4
hearing by the appellate division.
In an opinion by Justice Haneman, the Marini court noted
113 Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273.
114 Id. at 462-63, 251 A.2d at 278.
115 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).

116 See Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 382, 140 A.2d 199, 201
(1958).
117 See Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 145, 130 A.2d
833, 837 (1957).
118 Marini, 56 N.J. at 134, 265 A.2d at 528.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 134-35, 265 A.2d at 528. The tenant paid the plumber's fee of $85.72
and sent the receipt along with a check for $9.28 to the landlord. Her monthly
rental was $95. Id.
121 Id. at 135, 265 A.2d at 528. This action was brought pursuant to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 18-53(b) (West Supp. 1986), for non-payment of $85.72 (July's rent) and
of $95 (August's rent). Marini, 56 N.J. at 135, 265 A.2d at 528.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id., 265 A.2d at 529.
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that certain covenants may arise in a lease both through implication and effectuation of the parties' intent.' 2 5 Justice Haneman
further asserted that the intended purpose of the Marini lease
was to provide the lessee with adequate living quarters-and the
landlord had failed in this regard.' 2 6 Moreover, the Marini court
opined that in "a modern setting, the landlord should, in residential letting, be held to an implied covenant against latent defects.' 2 7 This implied covenant remains in force for the entire
term of the lease with the landlord being "required to maintain
[the] facilities in a condition which renders the property livable."' 28 Consequently, the Marini court held that under this "implied warrant of habitability," a tenant may make needed repairs
and subsequently
offset the expense against his rental
29
1
obligation.
Following the Reste and Marini decisions, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Berzito v. Gambino,'3 ° considered the viability
of the traditional notion that covenants contained in a lease were
3
independent in view of modem landlord-tenant relationships.' '
Historically, unless expressly or impliedly agreed upon within the
parameters of the lease, the various covenants were considered
independent.3 2 Consequently, a breach of the lessee's covenant
to pay rent would not afford the lessor the right to forfeit the
lease.'33 Similarly, a landlord's failure to keep leased premises in
good repair would not ordinarily permit a defense in an action to
recover rent.' 3" In Berzito, Justice Mountain posited that the doc125 Id. at 143, 265 A.2d at 533 ("Subject matter and circumstances of the letting
give at least a clear clue to the natural intentions of the parties.").
126 Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 533-34.
127 Id., 265 A.2d at 534.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535. If the tenant is to take such measures, the repairs
must be preceded by timely notice to the landlord in an attempt to have the landlord effectuate the needed repairs. Id.
130 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). Berzito was not the first time the supreme
court considered the independence of covenants in a lease. See, e.g., Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 459, 251 A.2d 268, 276 (1969) (adopting Higgins
doctrine regarding mutual dependence of lease covenants); Higgins v. Whiting,
102 N.J.L. 279, 281, 131 A. 879, 880 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1926) (landlord's agreement to
supply heat and tenant's agreement to pay rent mutually dependent covenants).
13' See Berzilo, 63 N.J. at 460, 308 A.2d at 17; see also Hicks, supra note 3, at 453-54.
Conversely, consonant with contract principles, each party to the contract is both
promisor and promisee in the expectation of mutual performance. The agreed
upon performances are therefore dependent upon each other and default by one
party results in an invalidation of the corresponding counter-promise. Id. at 453.
1"32Hicks, supra note 3, at 454.
1'3 Id.
34 Id.
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trine of independent covenants in leaseholds was the most sacred
consequence of the traditional doctrine that landlord-tenant relationships be viewed within the analytical5 framework of property
law rather than principles of contract.'1
In Berzito, the tenant entered the leasehold agreement upon
the landlord's promise that repairs necessary to make the apartment adequately habitable would be completed. 1 6 After twentyfive months of residing in deplorable living conditions 13 7 with
minimal improvements having been made, the tenant quit the
premises. 13 8 Justice Mountain initially observed that the tenant
did not vacate the premises alleging a constructive eviction,
which would have afforded her the remedy mandated in Reste, 13 9
nor did she make the required repairs with a concomitant offset
of rent in accordance with Marini.'4 °
The defendant landlord argued, however, that where the
landlord is at fault, no other remedy other than that provided in
Reste and Marini was available. 14 1 Justice Mountain opined that,
under ordinary breach of contract principles, the proper remedy
would be to award the tenant damages equal to the difference
between the rent actually paid and the actual value of the defective premises. '4' This theory of damages, however, stood in diametrical opposition to the traditional notion that covenants in a
lease are independent. 143 Nonetheless, the Berzito court held that
this antiquated property principle would no longer govern
leases.' 44 In their view, the covenant of habitability and the cove135 Berzito, 63 N.J. at 468, 308 A.2d at 21.

Id. at 463, 308 A.2d at 18.
See id., 308 A.2d at 18-19. At the commencement of the lease, radiators were
missing, many screens and storm windows were either broken or missing, windows
were boarded up, there were holes in the walls and floors, and several electrical
fixtures were broken. There was also sewage backup and infestation of roaches and
rodents in the cellar. Id.
138 Id. at 464, 308 A.2d at 19. Six months before the tenant abandoned the
premises, the landlord brought a summary dispossess action against the tenant for
alleged non-payment of rent. Id. The trial court held that the landlord had
breached the express warranty of habitability and awarded the tenant a retroactive
rent reduction from the date at which the tenant stopped paying rent. This reduced rent was never paid. Id.
139 See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
140 See Berzito, 63 N.J. at 467, 308 A.2d at 20; see also supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
141 See Berzilo, 63 N.J. at 468, 308 A.2d at 21.
142 Id. at 467, 308 A.2d at 21.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
136
137
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nant to pay rent are to be considered mutually dependent.' 45 Ac46
cordingly, the plaintiff's cause of action for rent was sustained. 1
A further advancement occurred in Sommer v. Kridel, 147 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the traditional property concept that a landlord had no duty to mitigate
his damages after a tenant defaults. 4 8 The court held that the
contractual aspects of a lease, when viewed through modern notions of fairness and equity, mandate that a landlord has a duty to
mitigate if he subsequently desires to seek recovery of rental
49
monies from the defaulting tenant.'

Few cases have addressed the precise issue of how to divide
excess rent collected in a suit for damages after a tenant's default. In Truitt v. Evangel Temple, Inc. ,'

however, the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals addressed issues identical to those
presented in N.J. IndustrialProperties. In Truitt, the tenant vacated

leased premises after twelve months of occupancy.' 5 ' The property remained vacant for eight months. 52 Thereafter, the landlord relet the premises for a greater monthly rent than called for
Id.
Id., 308 A.2d at 22.
147 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977).
148 Id. at 449, 378 A.2d at 769. Historically, a landlord was under no duty to
mitigate his damages after a breach of the lease because the lease conveyed an
"interest in land" to the tenant. Id. Thus, the landlord was not to be concerned
with the tenant's abandonment of his own property. Id.; see also Tanella v. Rettagliata, 120 N.J. Super. 400, 294 A.2d 431 (Bergen Cty. Ct. 1972); Heyman v. Linwood Park, 41 N.J. Super. 437, 135 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1956); but see Dushoff v.
Phoenix Co., 23 Ariz. App. 238, 532 P.2d 180 (1975); Wilson v. Ruhl, 277 Md. 607,
356 A.2d 544 (1976).
149 See Sommer, 74 N.J. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773. Justice Pashman opined that New
Jersey, as a leader in requiring landlords to "provide housing services in accordance with implied duties," will use contractual parameters in construing leases. Id.
Application of contract principles gives rise to a continuing obligation between the
respective parties. Consequently, there is no reason why the accepted contract
principles guiding mitigation should not apply to the lease. Id. at 455-56, 378 A.2d
at 772. In so holding, the Sommer court reflected on Professor McCormick's prediction that:
[t]he logic, inescapable according to the standards of a 'jurisprudence of
conceptions' which permits the landlord to stand idly by the vacant,
abandoned premises and treat them as the property of the tenant and
recover full rent will yield to the more realistic notions of social advantage which in other fields of the law have forbidden a recovery for damages which the plaintiff by reasonable efforts would have avoided.
Id. (quoting McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by
the Tenant, 23 Micn. L. REv. 211, 221-22 (1925)).
' 5 486 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1984).
151 Id. at 1171.
152 Id.
145

146
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under the original lease. 15 3 The landlord then sued the breaching tenant for rent due during the eight month vacancy.' 54
The lower c6urt determined that the rent received by the
landlord from the subsequent tenant during the remainder of the
breaching tenant's term exceeded the rent due under the original
lease.' 55 Utilizing contract principles, the court asserted that a
landlord who relets after abandonment may only recover "the
difference between the amount he would have received under the
first lease and the amount he actually receives under the second." 15 6 Accordingly, the lower court held that the landlord had
sustained no damages. 5 7 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed and posited that "when a landlord benefits financially from abandonment of the premises by the original tenant,
he suffers no damages, and is not entitled to recover any money
from that tenant."'5 8 For support, the court cited Ostrow v.
Smulkin.' 59 In Ostrow, the court opined that "depending on the
circumstances and contractual provisions in the lease, the tenant
may be liable for damages even after the landlord has retaken
possession,
but this liability is for breach of contract and not for
60
1
rent."
Some New Jersey cases, while not precisely on point are
closely analogous to the issues presented in N.J. IndustrialProperties. 16 1 In Whitcomb v. Brant,1 62 for example, the tenant aban153
154

Id.
Id.

155 Id.
156 Id.

at 1172.

157 Id.
158 Id.
159 249 A.2d 520 (D.C. 1969).

Id. at 521.
See, e.g., Locks v. Wade, 36 N.J. Super. 128, 114 A.2d 875 (App. Div. 1955).
In N.J. Indus. Properties,JusticeStein, in his dissent, utilized this analogous case dealing with personal property to support his theory of damages. N.J. Indus. Properties,
100 N.J. at 463-64, 495 A.2d at 1338 (Stein, J., dissenting). In Locks, the appellate
division assessed damages after the defendant lessee defaulted on the lease of a
jukebox. Locks, 36 N.J. Super. at 129, 114 A.2d at 876. The defendant in Locks
sought a credit for the damages assessed against him after the plaintiff lessor relet
the same jukebox. Id. at 130, 114 A.2d at 876. The Locks court approached the
issue of damages from the theory of market supply. Id. The court compared jukeboxes, which are not unique or of limited market supply, to realty, which is unique
and of limited market supply. Id. The court noted that even absent the breach of
contract for the specific jukebox, the plaintiff lessor could just as well have entered
another lease agreement for an identical jukebox. Id. The court compared this with
the breach of realty, where but for the breach of a specific lease of property, the
aggrieved lessor would not gain an opportunity to relet at a greater profit. Id.
160
161
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doned the premises after occupying the leased property for six
years at a monthly rental of $200 per month.' 6 Thereafter, the
landlord relet the property after a two month vacancy at a
monthly rate of $225. 164 The plaintiff tenant then sued the landlord claiming that the excess rent collected under the original
term of the lease was his property.' 65 The Whitcomb court reasoned that the tenant's abandonment of the leasehold severed his
privity of estate yet simultaneously left him in privity of contract
with the landlord.1 66 The tenant was thus liable for rent accruing
after the abandonment.' 6 ' Accordingly, the court held that the
subsequent rents were to be credited to the tenant to the extent
of his remaining contractual obligation under the lease.' 68 The
court asserted, however, that "one who by the voluntary violation
of his covenant, produces a status of non-feasance and default...
[and] seeks to reap a benefit and extract a reward" should not
for a retroactive credit flowgain the benefit of a cause of action
169
ing from the landlord's reletting.
Significantly, the landlord in Whitcomb did not allege a counterclaim for the rent due during the defaulting tenant's two
month vacancy.' 7 ° Consequently, the court only analyzed the
time frame after the reletting and did not specifically address
whether or not the tenant would have been credited with the ex7
cess rent for the period when the property remained vacant.' '
This precise issue was left unresolved in New Jersey for over
sixty-five years until the court rendered its decision in N.J. Industrial Properties.
In N.J. Industrial Properties, the New Jersey Supreme Court

held that a commercial tenant who breaches a lease remains liable for the rent due during the period that the premises are vacant prior to reletting, and that the tenant should not be credited
with excess rent collected from a subsequent tenant. 72 Writing
Therefore, the Locks court did not credit the defendant lessee with the fiscal gains
made by the plaintiff in reletting the jukebox. Id.
162 90 N.J.L. 245, 100 A. 175 (E. & A. 1917).
163 Id. at 246, 100 A. at 176.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 247, 100 A. at 176.
166 Id. at 248, 100 A. at 176-77.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 251, 100 A. at 177-78.
[69 Id., 100 A. at 178.
170 Id. at 246, 100 A. at 176.
171 See id. at 248-49, 100 A. at 176-77; see also N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 NJ. at 46869, 495 A.2d at 1341 (Stein, J, dissenting).
172 Nj. Indus. Properties, 100 NJ. at 449, 495 A.2d at 1330.
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for the majority, Justice Garibaldi began her legal analysis of the
case with an assessment of the terms of the lease.1 73 The justice
noted that paragraphs ten' 74 and twenty 75 in the lease furnished
the landlord, NJ.I.P., with distinct means for re-entry on the
premises.1 76 Specifically, paragraph ten of the lease stipulated
that the landlord could re-enter as the tenant's agent. 77 Under
this approach, the court posited that the tenant would remain liable for rent accruing while the property was vacant. 178 Moreover,
upon a subsequent reletting, the court opined that the original
tenant would remain liable for any rent deficiency or be entitled
to a credit in the amount of the actual rent received by the landlord. 79 Alternatively, the court noted that upon default, paragraph twenty of the lease empowered the landlord to re-enter the
premises on his own behalf, 80 in which case the law will "[imply]
an acceptance of the tenant's surrender, thereby relieving the
tenant of any future liability." 1 8' Accordingly, Justice Garibaldi
noted that the method of re-entry
was of crucial import to the
1 82
resolution of the damages issue.

The court next dismissed, as having no factual support, the
appellate division's reliance on paragraph ten of the lease and
that court's subsequent conclusion that NJ.I.P. had re-entered as
an agent of the tenant.183 The majority observed that, after
Crayonne's abandonment, the plaintiff landlord had given notice
to both Crayonne and the Licaris that the lease was terminated
pursuant to paragraph twenty.' 84 Consequently, the court concluded that N.J.I.P. re-entered on its own behalf and not as the
85
agent of the tenant.

Justice Garibaldi further reasoned that parties may covenant
173 Id. at 437-38, 495 A.2d at 1323.
174 See supra note 54 for text of paragraph 10.
175 See supra note 28 for text of paragraph 20.
176

ArJ.Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 438, 495 A.2d at 1323.
and accompanying text.
100 N.J. at 438, 495 A.2d at 1323.

177 Id.; see supra note 54
178 N.J. Indus. Properties,
179 Id.

180 Id.
181 Id.

Id.
Id. at 438-39, 495 A.2d at 1324.
Id. at 439, 495 A.2d at 1324.
Id. In determining that N.J.I.P. re-entered the premises for its own account,
the court relied on paragraph 15 of the lease which provided: "That if default be
made in any of the covenants herein contained, then it shall be lawful for the said
Landlord to re-enter the said premises, and the same to have again, re-possess and
enjoy." Id. at 439 n.3, 495 A.2d at 1324 n.3.
182
183
184
185
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that certain obligations will survive the extinguishment of the
landlord-tenant relationship via agreements which are frequently
embodied within a survival clause.' 86 Moreover, the court noted
that the survival clause has a long history of judicial recognition
in New Jersey. 187 The N.J. Industrial Properties court then noted
that the survival clause incorporated in paragraph twenty-five of
the lease provided that "the [t]enant shall remain liable and shall
pay in monthly payments the rent which accrues subsequent to
the re-entry of the Landlord. ..."8 8 If upon the termination of

the landlord-tenant relationship and a subsequent reletting there
was a deficiency in rent collected, the majority posited that the
defaulting tenant would ultimately be responsible for that
deficiency. 18
After acknowledging the validity of paragraph twenty-five,
the court noted that both parties relied on this section of the
lease to support their positions. 90 The plaintiff landlord argued
that in each month in which there was a rental deficiency a separate cause of action accrued.' 9 ' Therefore, the proper measure
of damages should be in increments of rent lost monthly. 192 Alternatively, defendant tenant contended that the proper time frame
93
for measuring damages should be thefull term of the lease.
The court observed that paragraph twenty-five provided no
determinative guideline for ascertaining whether the landlord or
prior defaulting tenant should be credited with excess rent. 9'
While acknowledging the paucity of precedent specifically examining this issue, the majority noted that similar lease provisions
had been interpreted as providing separate and independent
Id. at 439-40, 495 A.2d at 1324-25.
Id.; see also Raleigh Realty Corp. v. Jacobs, 127 N.J.L. 454, 455 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1941) (supra note 84 and accompanying text); Fleming v. Matter Construction
Corp., 11 N.J. Misc. 129, 132, 164 A. 585 (Hudson Cty. Cir. Ct. 1933) (supra note
41 and accompanying text); Fibish v. Bennett, 131 N.J.L. 98, 35 A.2d 39 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1943), aff'd, 132 N.J.L. 168, 39 A.2d 97 (E. & A. 1944) (affirming validity of
survival clause in lease).
188 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 440, 495 A.2d at 1325.
186

187

189

Id.

at 441, 495 A.2d at 1325.
191 Id. N.J.I.P. argued that defendant Y.C.V.L. was liable for the full monthly
rent during the four months the property was vacant. Id. The defendant would
also be credited in full for the last four months of the term remaining on its lease
from the rent collected from the subsequent tenant Crayonne. Id.
192 Id. (emphasis added).
193 Id. The defendant Y.C.V.L. argued that the excess rent collected beyond that
received for the remaining eight months of the lease should be credited to its account. Id. (emphasis added).
194 Id.
190 Id.
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causes of action which would accrue monthly. ' 5 The court
noted that a similar survival clause was analyzed by the New York
Court of Appeals in the 1902 case of McCready v. Lindenborn. 9 6
The pertinent lease agreement in McCready stated that "as damages for the breach of the covenant for rent" the difference between rent due and rent received "shall from time to time be
ascertained." 19 7 Relying on this provision, the McCready court
held that a separate and independent cause of action for damages
198
and rent accrued each month until the end of the lease term.
Embracing this holding, the N.J. Industrial Properties majority asserted that damages due the landlord should be measured in
terms of rent lost monthly.1 99
Justice Garibaldi also cited the 1917 decision in Whitcomb v.
Brant in support of the majority's position.20 0 In Whitcomb, the
defaulting tenant attempted to turn his breach into gain by asserting a claim for excess rent collected from the next tenant.2 0 '
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals refused to award
the retroactive credit to a defaulting tenant "who by the voluntary violation of his covenant, produces a status of non-feasance
and default, from which acts of deliction he seeks to reap a benefit and extract a reward; an anomaly, as we have seen, which can
find no support in legal principle. ' 2 2 While Whitcomb did not
address the issue of whether or not the tenant would have been
credited with excess rent had the landlord counterclaimed for
damages, the N.J. Industrial Properties majority utilized Whitcomb's
analogous principle that a tenant should not benefit from a
breach.20 3
Finally, the majority posited that the applicable precepts of
property and contract law should be analyzed with notions of
fairness and equity in mind.20 4 Noting the importance of equitable principles in breach of contract actions, Justice Garibaldi
195
196

Id.

198

Id.

Id. (citing McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)); see also
supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of McCready.
197 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 NJ. at 441, 495 A.2d at 1325 (citing McCready v.
Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 65 N.E. 208 (1902)).
Id. at 443, 495 A.2d at 1326.
Id. at 443-44, 495 A.2d at 1327 (citing Whitcomb v. Brant, 90 N.J.L. 245, 100
A. 175 (E. & A. 1917)); see also supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
201 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 444, 495 A.2d at 1327 (citing Whitcomb v.
Brant, 90 NJ.L. 245, 100 A. 175 (E. & A. 1917)).
202 Id. (quoting Whitcomb v. Brant, 90 N.J.L. 245, 100 A. 175 (E. & A. 1917)).
203 Id. at 444, 495 A.2d at 1327.
204 Id. at 446-47, 495 A.2d at 1328-29.
199
200

1987]

NOTES

opined that "[w]hen a tenant breaches a lease and abandons the
premises, it is the landlord who is left with an empty building, the
concomitant risks of fire, theft, and vandalism, and the burden of
finding another tenant."20 5 Further, if an inequity had to befall
either the landlord or tenant, the majority asserted that principles of fairness dictate that the inequity should be borne by the
lessee.2 °6 Additionally, the court reasoned that since N.J.I.P.
after the breach, the
promptly attempted to mitigate damages
' 20 7
"benefit must go to the landlord.
In his dissent, Justice Stein asserted that the majority ignored the contemporary movement toward the interpretation of
leases in accordance with contract principles.20 8 In his view, the
majority had unjustifiably relied on outdated property
precepts.20 9 The dissenting justice also noted New Jersey's leading role in landlord-tenant jurisprudence 210 and posited that
merely recognizing the import of contract principles is insufficient.2 1' Rather, certain lease provisions must be construed "in a
manner that reflects their inherently contractual character, free
from the taint of property law principles that they were designed
to overcome." 2 12 Justice Stein maintained that the survival
clause in N.J. IndustrialPropertieswas akin to the clauses in Fleming
and McCready, which were contractual provisions designed to
override the rigid property law restrictions that limited a landlord's remedies.2 13 The justice further noted that traditional
common law property principles precluded a landlord from terminating a lease, reletting, and then recovering damages.214 In
his view, the crux of the survival clause 215 was its contractual
remedy, rather than the majority's assertion that the clause proId. at 448-49, 495 A.2d at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 447, 495 A.2d at 1329.
Id. at 450, 495 A.2d at 1330 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 456, 495 A.2d at 1333 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 455, 495 A.2d at 1333 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Stein noted the court's observations inJavins: "Ironically .. .the
rules governing the construction and interpretation of 'predominantly contractual
obligations' in leases have too often remained rooted in old property law." Id.
(quotingJavins, 428 F.2d at 1074-75).
213 See N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 455, 495 A.2d at 1333 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
214 Id. at 468, 495 A.2d at 1341 (Stein, J., dissenting).
215 See id. at 459-60, 495 A.2d at 1336 (Stein, J., dissenting). The survival clause
provided that:
[T]he tenant shall pay as damages for the breach of the covenants contained in this lease the difference between the rent reserved and the rent
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
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vided for a claim for rent; therefore, Justice Stein concluded that
should govern the assessment and
accepted contract principles
21 6
allocation of damages.

Justice Stein also asserted that the compensatory damages
theory requires that injured parties be put in a position as good
as they would have been had the breach not occurred.217 Moreover, the justice noted that "[t]his principle has a broad and general application, not
only to commercial contracts, but also to
' 2 18
leases of property.

The dissent also relied on the decision in Sommer,21 9 in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a duty to mitigate damages upon residential landlords after a breach. 220 Accordingly,
the justice asserted that "the only question is whether we follow
the normal rule of mitigation and credit defendants with all the
rent received by the landlord until the end of the term."' 22 1 Criti-

cizing the majority, Justice Stein opined that circuitous reasoning
had resulted in "a special rule for the mitigation of damages for
breaching a lease." ' 22

2

In effect, a tenant's credit in any month

could never exceed the rent due under the original lease.2 23
Justice Stein then noted that if a landlord did not want to
share the benefits of a more profitable lease with his tenant in
default, the simple solution would be to terminate the tenant's
liability prior to the incipience of a subsequent lease. 224 Justice

Stein posited that only where a landlord seeks to maintain original tenant liability under a survival clause does "excess rent" becollected and received, if any, by the landlord, during the remainder for
the unexpired term.
Id. at 459, 495 A.2d at 1336 (Stein, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 460, 495 A.2d at 1336-37 (Stein, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 461, 495 A.2d at 1336; see also Giumarra v. Harrington Heights, Inc., 33
NJ. Super. 178, 196, 109 A.2d 695, 704 (App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 18 N.J. 548, 114
A.2d 720 (1955); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338

at 198 (3d ed. 1968).
218 ,VJ. Indus. Properties, 100 NJ. at 461, 495 A.2d at 1336-37 (Stein, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 992 (1964)).
219 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sommer.
220 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 461-62, 495 A.2d at 1337 (Stein, J., dissenting). In Sommer, the New Jersey Supreme Court reserved for decision whether a
landlord must mitigate in a commercial setting. Sommer, 100 N.J. at 456 n.4, 378
A.2d at 772 n.4. In N.J. Indus. Properties, Justice Stein asserted that "the mitigation
principles set forth in Sommer should apply with equal force to a commercial lease."
N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 462 n.5, 495 A.2d at 1337 n.5 (Stein,J., dissenting).
221 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 462, 495 A.2d at 1337 (Stein, J., dissenting).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
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come an issue. 22 5 Relying on contract law damage principles,
Justice Stein asserted that the total rent collected each month by
N.J.I.P. from the new tenant should have been credited against
the original tenant's total liability, regardless of whether the new
monthly rent exceeded the original monthly rent.2 2 6 Consequently, the "excess rent" collected above and beyond the original tenant's total liability for rent and damages should inure to
the landlord.2 2 7 Justice Stein observed that this theory was consonant with the position embraced by the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts.2 2 8 Justice Stein posited that under the Restatement, a
plaintiff must mitigate once the breach has occurred or is imminent and further provides that gains derived from the mitigation
which would not have occurred, but for the breach, should be
deducted from the amount otherwise recoverable.2 2 9
Justice Stein utilized the analogous case of Locks v. Wade,
which °involved a lease of personal property, to buttress his posi-

tion.

0
231

In Locks, the defendant defaulted on the lease of a juke-

23

box. ' When the plaintiff later relet the same jukebox, the
defendant sought a credit against his damages.23 2 The Locks
court denied the credit positing that the jukebox was not a
unique item and that the market supply ofjukeboxes was not limited. 23 ' The Locks court further reasoned that absent a breach,
the lessor could still have secured an identical jukebox and executed a second lease agreement. 2 34 Therefore, the lessor had not
benefited by the lessee's breach.2 3 5 The appellate division in
Locks stated, however, that realty differs because it is unique and
Id.
Id.
227 Id. at 462-63 n.8, 495 A.2d at 1337 n.8 (Stein, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 462-63, 495 A.2d at 1337-38 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 336(1) comment a, at 536 (1932)).
229 Id. at 463, 495 A.2d at 1338 (Stein,J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAw OF CONTRACTS, § 336 (1) comment a, at 536 (1932));see also Goetz & Scott, The
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV.
967, 975 n.22 (1983) (principles consistent with purpose behind mitigation and
joint minimization of cost mandates that breacher be credited with any excess profit
obtained by virtue of breach).
230 N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 463, 495 A.2d at 1338 (Stein, J., dissenting)
(citing Locks v. Wade, 36 N.J. Super. 128, 114 A.2d 875 (App. Div. 1955)); see also
supra note 161 for a discussion of Locks.
231 See Locks, 36 N.J. Super. at 129, 114 A.2d at 876.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 130, 114 A.2d at 877.
234 Id. at 130-31, 114 A.2d at 877.
235 Id.
225

226
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not easily duplicated on the market.23 6 Thus, absent the breach
of a specific lease for real property, a landlord could not benefit. 2 3 7 Therefore, the general rule established by Locks is that
gains made after the breach of a lease will not result in a deduction from damages unless the breach enabled the non-breaching
party to make fiscal gains. 23 8 Applying this rule to the instant
matter, Justice Stein concluded that Crayonne's breach clearly
enabled N.J.I.P. to gain.23 9 Consequently, the damages suffered
by the plaintiff should be reduced by the amount of the gain.2 40
In essence, the N.J. Industrial Properties court was faced with
the challenge of deciding whether to permit a further integration
of contract principles into the traditionally sovereign area of
property law. 24 1 Many scholars and commentators have declared
that the distinction between contract and property law is of artificial construct.
This view, however, overlooks the historical realities which have guided the development of these distinct areas
of the law. 243 Although a lease is essentially a contractual relationship between parties, the laws governing leases of real property were developed over many centuries in response to the
concrete needs of individuals who felt that the protection of their
homestead and their means of agricultural livelihood were paramount.24 4 In contrast, the modern lease of an apartment or commercial complex includes crucial appurtenances such as heat, hot
water, walls, elevator services, secure doors, and windows-all of
which are under the exclusive control of the landlord.2 4 5 Consequently, the lessor's covenants in a contemporary lease have become increasingly more numerous and critical.2 4 6 Jurists,
therefore, have recognized that the implementation of contract
236
237

Id.
Id.

238

Id.

N.J. Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 463-64, 495 A.2d at 1338 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
239

240

Id.

See generally Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24, 2526 (1970) (discussion of modern trend to integrate traditional property law principles with contract principles).
242 See generally Chase & Taylor, Landlord and Tenant: A Study In Property and Contract, 30 VILL. L. REV. 571, 572-77 (1985) (some scholars assert that property law
and contract law dichotomy is more rhetorical than real).
243 Id.
244 See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
245 See generally Note, The Modern Lease-An Estate In Land Or a Contract, 16 TExAs
L. REV. 47, 72 (1937) (discussion of interaction between property and contract law
in modem leaseholds).
246 Id.
241
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principles and remedies results in more equitable resolutions of
landlord-tenant disputes.247 Thus, the evolution of the property
lease has resulted in a very real duality wherein property and
contract precepts interact in construing a lease.
The majority's decision in N.J. Industrial Properties, however,
indicates an entrenchment of an underlying and age-old premise
that parties should be held firmly to their agreement and, more
specifically, that breaches of lease agreements should be deterred.248 Courts are not often explicit about establishing rules
which discourage default. Significantly, however, courts also create damage theories with respect to breached leases and contracts that do not encourage default. 24 9 This policy stems from the
moral viewpoint that it is fair and correct to hold parties to agree-

ments which they have entered with mutual assent. 250 Indeed, as
Professor Corbin observed of parties entering a contract, "the
law of contracts attempts the realization of the reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise. [I]t is
believed that an understanding of many of the existing rules and
a determination of their effectiveness require a lively consciousness of this underlying purpose."-2 5' In ascertaining the underlying purpose of a commercial lease or contract, however, one
arrives at the inescapable conclusion that the parties have entered the agreement for the ultimate purpose of deriving economic benefit and not for "higher" personal values.2 5 2
If in a given situation the breach of a contract or lease will
result in mutual benefit to both parties, then the notion that
"morality" and "higher values" should continue to bind the par247 SeeJavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 n.13 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). TheJavins court stated that a contractual approach
does not detract from the vital import that the land is in fact involved in the transaction and that whenever contracts between private parties are examined courts must
be sensitive to a myriad of different factors. Id. TheJavins court further stated that
"[w]e believe contract doctrines allow courts to be properly sensitive to all relevant
factors in interpreting lease obligations." Id.
248 See Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 277, 279 (1972). The author observed that "[the law] seeks to penalize the
potential contract violator in such a way that he normally prefers not to violate, and
is thus defined by the alternatives he faces in carrying out the contract or not." Id.
249 Id.

250 See generally Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
475-78 (1980).
251 See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 at 2 (1952).
252 See Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second
Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 119 (1981) (discussion of moral compulsion

surrounding conventional damage doctrines and modern theories in determining
economically efficient and just results).
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ties falls to the background. The question is therefore
presented-why did the majority fashion a damage doctrine
which deters tenant default when both parties could be placed in
a better position after breach?
The rent at issue in N.J. IndustrialPropertieswas set in 1976.253
With the knowledge of increased real estate values and concomitant advances in lease price potential, N.J.I.P., if permitted to
relet, could surely have obtained greater profits each month.
The breach by Crayonne provided N.J.I.P. with this opportunity.
The survival clause, which provides an inherently contractual
remedy, was inserted in the lease by the landlord, N.J.I.P., and
254
provided security in the event a new tenant was not found.
N.J.I.P. was also presented with the opportunity to allow
Y.C.V.L. to reoccupy the vacant property. Accordingly, Y.C.V.L.
would have assumed payment of rent under the lease. 25 5 Essentially, the landlord could not lose-N.J.I.P. would be put in as
good a position as if the original lease obligations had been
honored.
As noted by Justice Stein, had N.J.I.P. not wanted to share
the benefit of a new, more lucrative lease, a simple solution was
available. 2 56 N.J.I.P. could have terminated Y.C.V.L.'s liability
prior to the reletting and held the tenant accountable for damages up to the date on which its liability was terminated.2 5 7 After
such termination, Y.C.V.L. would have no claim for a credit from
the rent paid by the subsequent tenant.2 5 8 Only under the facts
presented in N.J. IndustrialProperties-alandlord exercising rights
encompassed in a survival clause-does the disposition of the excess rent issue arise. 25 9 N.J.I.P. terminated the lease but did not
wish to terminate Y.C.V.L.'s liability under the survival clause.
Curiously, the majority, after recognizing the validity of
Y.C.V.L.'s contractual liability under the survival clause, held
that N.J.I.P. could unilaterally deprive Y.C.V.L. of credit from the
260
higher monthly rent paid by Crayonne.
At the heart of the majority's opinion is a characterization of
the operative language in the survival clause as creating a cause
253
254
255
256

MJ. Indus.
Id. at 435,
Id. at 451,
Id. at 462,

257
258
259

Id.
Id.
Id.

260

Id. at 462 n.6, 495 A.2d at 1337 n.6 (Stein, J., dissenting).

Properties, 100 N.J. at 434, 495 A.2d at 1321.
495 A.2d at 1322.
495 A.2d at 1331 (Stein, J., dissenting).
495 A.2d at 1337 (Stein, J., dissenting).
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of action for lost rent as opposed to contractual damages. 26 ' The
majority observed that "the draftsman was careful to insert in the
lease paragraph twenty-five, establishing not only the manner of
payment but also the quantum of payment. ' 26 2 While an express
reading of the survival clause reveals use of the word "rent," the
quintessential issue presented in N.J. Industrial Properties was the
appropriate time
frame for the measure of damages in the event
2 63
of a breach.

The majority's interpretation disregards the premise that the
survival clause is a contractual remedy borne from a landlord's
desire to overcome rigid property doctrines. As noted by the dissent, "the majority ignores the history and language of the survival clause and perpetuates an unwarranted distinction, as to the
measure of damages for breach, between leases and other contracts. "264 The majority's literal interpretation of paragraph
twenty-five provides little doctrinal guidance for the interpretation of vague covenants or clauses in subsequent cases.
The majority also asserted that "reasonable expectation of
the parties" leads to the position that the breaching tenant's
credit would be limited to the period when the subsequent tenant
leased the premises. 265 This position was also derived from paragraph twenty-five's survival clause. The court reasoned that
"[c]ertainly no landlord could expect that the excess rent he received from a subsequent tenant would accrue to the benefit of
the breaching tenant. "266 Yet, the court failed to recognize or
advance an opinion as to the expectations of the tenant. Certainly, a tenant should not expect to profit from his breach. It is
equally clear, however, that the tenant would not reasonably expect that the landlord would profit over and above the original
lease while simultaneously having the right to maintain an action
for damages.
In ascertaining the reasonable expectations of the parties, it
accords with common sense that individuals entering a lease anticipate performance and not a breach. In the event of a
breached lease, however, jurists have asserted that contract principles should be applied in order to effectuate the legitimate ex261
262
263
264
265
266

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

441, 495 A.2d at 1325.
442, 495 A.2d at 1326 (emphasis added).
441, 495 A.2d at 1325.
468-69, 495 A.2d at 1341 (Stein, J., dissenting).
443, 495 A.2d at 1326.
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pectations of the parties.267 Multiparagraph leases with
boilerplate survival clauses necessitate the use of contract damage theories as opposed to the literal interpretation and assessment of damages as enunciated by the majority in N.J. Industrial
Properties.

Finally, the majority asserted that the defendant, Y.C.V.L.,
was the "wrongdoer," and therefore should not be allowed to
benefit from their breach.268 While Y.C.V.L. remained liable for
contract damages under the survival clause, Crayonne, Y.C.V.L.'s
assignee, was the actual wrongdoer. 269 A complete discussion of
the equities should include this facet of the breach. Similarly, the
contract principle embracing the notion that the aggrieved party
should be placed in as good a position had the breach not occurred, is premised on implicit notions of fairness and equity.
Thus, had the majority deemed it proper to utilize this contract
principle, a fallback and reliance on purely equitable principles
would have been unnecessary.
Justice Stein's dissenting opinion in N.J. Industrial Properties

constitutes a logical extension of the doctrinal foundation laid by
the New Jersey Supreme Court from Reste through Sommer.2 7 ° In
that progressive series of cases, the need to integrate contract
principles into the interpretation of leases was stressed. The resultant analytical legacy, in such areas as mitigation of damages
and the implied warranty of habitability, was clear doctrinal guidance which yielded unequivocal results in subsequent decisions. 2 7 1 Justice Stein's position in N.J. Industrial Properties, when
applied to future cases involving the abrogation of a lease, would
See, e.g.,Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075.
Indus. Properties, 100 N.J. at 447, 495 A.2d at 1329 (emphasis added).
269 Id. at 467, 495 A.2d at 1340 (Stein, J., dissenting).
270 See supra notes 102-49 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 465-69, 308 A.2d 17, 19-21 (1973).
The Berzito court, in deciding whether or not covenants of a lease are mutually dependent, relied heavily upon the doctrinal foundation supplied by Reste and IvIaini.
Id. The Berzito court noted that the Reste court, by way of dictum, stated that "present day demands of fair treatment for tenants with respect to latent defects remediable by the landlord, either within the demised premises or outside the demised
premises, require imposition on him of an implied warranty against such defects."
Id. at 465, 308 A.2d at 20 (quoting Reste, 53 N.J. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273). Justice
Mountain then noted that the dictum in Reste became law in Amni when the court
held that a residential lease contains an implied warranty of habitability. Beito, 63
N.J. at 466, 308 A.2d at 20. While neither Reste nor A'ini supplied a specific remedy for the particular fact scenario in Berzito, Justice Mountain built upon the doctrine of those cases to fashion a remedy resulting in a further departure from the
rigid results of property precepts. Id. at 469-70, 308 A.2d at 21.
267

268 N.J.
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produce equitable results consonant with advancements proffered in New Jersey case law since Reste.
Justice Stein's recognition of the property lease's modern
contractual nature and his concomitant assertion that a contract
remedy should be applied in the instant case, was well founded.
Given the particular facts in N.J. IndustrialProperties, the dissent's
position that the proper time frame for measuring damages
should be the entire term of the lease, and not monthly rent due
after the breach, was a logical analysis of the history, character,
and purpose behind survival clauses. Historically, survival
clauses and similar covenants in property leases have been responses to widespread dissatisfaction with the antiquated property precepts which severely restricted lessors and lessees.272 As
a result, the property lease has been contractually modified to
allow "the intention of the parties to supersede [the property]
doctrines no longer viable in our society. '2 73 Landlords utilized
these contractual covenants, and more particularly the survival
clause, to protect their interests and obtain an advantage. The
question arises then: why, with a contractual clause for damages,
should a landlord be allowed to maintain a cause of action for
rent? Landlords, however, as drafters of leases, gained an increasingly unequal bargaining power over their tenants. Potentially egregious situations which could arise from abusive use or
absence of certain covenants in a lease resulted in courts using
equitable contract principles with more force. This approach affords tenants parity with landlords and is essentially correct. The
infusion of contract principles in landlord-tenant relations, for
example, led to the inclusion of implied warranties of habitability
in leaseholds. The necessity of examining the absence or inclusion of a covenant for repair in a lease was thus eliminated-the
broad and equitable parameters of contract law governed.
Justice Stein's position echoes well the assertion of Judge
Wright in Javins that "[c]ourts have the duty to reappraise old
doctrines in the light of the facts and values of contemporary
life-particularly old common law doctrines which the courts
themselves developed and created. ' 274 The justice's theory in
N.J. Industrial Properties would provide resolution of the damage

assessment issue in breached leases similar to that which
stemmed from the inclusion of the implied warranty of habitabil272

273
274

iVJ. Indus. Properties, 100 NJ. at 455, 495 A.2d at 1333 (Stein, J., dissenting).

Id.
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
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ity in leases. In N.J. Industrial Properties, the approach supported
by Justice Stein avoids the ambiguity and speculation as to the
meaning of the word "rent" in contractually oriented survival
clauses. Moreover, broad contract principles utilized in other areas of property law have resulted in a more logical framework for
apportioning landlord and tenant responsibilities. The dissent's
recognition that survival clauses give rise to liability for contractual damages rather than liability for rent provides similar rationality in apportioning excess rent collected after a breach.
Ultimately, the disappointed landlord would be placed in a fair
and just position-a position as if the lease obligations had been
performed.
The remedy fashioned by the majority is inextricably entwined with the unique factual framework presented in N.J. Industrial Properties as colored by the lease's survival clause. The
majority's decision relied heavily upon antiquated case law and
failed to heed a clear modern trend-that contractual principles
and remedies should be utilized in the interpretation of property
leases. The presence of an almost equally divided court in N.J.
IndustrialPropertieshighlights the tenuous nature of this decision's
precedential value. Mindful of appreciating land values, it is apparent that the issue presented will arise in future breached lease
actions.
The legal characterization of the real property lease has undergone a metamorphosis from the belief that it conveyed an interest in land to the assertion that the modem lease conveys a
"package of goods." During this qualitative evolution, many jurists and scholars posited that the usage of contract principles to
construe leases was a fundamental necessity in the attainment of
more just results. Recognizing this fundamental necessity, New
Jersey has broken new analytical ground in pioneering the beneficial application of contract principles and remedies in prior
landlord-tenant cases. Curiously, in N.J. IndustrialProperties, New
Jersey's highest tribunal declined to expand the realm encompassing the intersection of the two distinct bodies of law. Indeed,
research demonstrates the absence of a recorded NewJersey case
where a landlord relet property for a greater sum after a tenant
default and subsequently brought an action against the original
tenant for damages. In spite of this precedential vacuum, New
Jersey has decided that the landlord should benefit in these circumstances. N.J. Industrial Properties signals a regressive movement from the posture of the court in such landmark decisions as
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Reste and Sommer. Justice Stein, in dissent, framed the proper
nexus between property and contract law in evaluating the modern lease. Only future decisions will indicate whether the majority's departure from a contractual influence in construing leases
will have a crossover effect in other areas of landlord-tenant jurisprudence or whether it will be limited to the particular factual
scenario presented in N.J. IndustrialProperties.
MichaelJ. Marone

